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IN PLANE VIEW: Is AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE A VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT? CALIFORNIA
V. CIRAOLO
On September 2, 1982, Detective Shutz of the Santa Clara Police De-
partment received an anonymous telephone message that marijuana
plants were growing in the backyard of Dante Carlo Ciraolo, a
Santa Clara resident. Initially Detective Shutz, trained in identifying mari-
juana, conducted a ground level investigation of the area surrounding
Ciraolo's home. He failed to observe any marijuana plants growing, how-
ever, because two fences, an outer one approximately six feet high and an
inner one approximately ten feet high, completely enclosed Ciraolo's backy-
ard. Later the same day Detective Shutz chartered a private plane to fly
over the Ciraolo neighborhood. Santa Clara County Narcotics Task Force
Agent Rodriguez, an expert in identifying marijuana cultivation from the
air, accompanied Shutz on the flight. The officers flew over the Ciraolo
home within navigable airspace at an altitude of 1000 feet. As the officers
flew over, they identified and photographed marijuana plants eight to ten
feet high growing in a fifteen by twenty-five foot plot in Ciraolo's backyard.
On September 8, 1982, based on information gathered during the aerial ob-
servation, Detective Shutz obtained a search warrant for Ciraolo's home.'
In executing the warrant the next day the police seized the seventy-three
plants that grew in Ciraolo's backyard. The plants were undisputedly identi-
fied as marijuana.
Ciraolo pleaded guilty to a charge of cultivating marijuana after the trial
court denied his motion to suppress the evidence of the search. The Califor-
nia Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the warrantless aerial sur-
veillance of Ciraolo's backyard constituted an unreasonable search in
violation of the fourth amendment. 2 The court based its decision on the fact
that the marijuana garden was within the curtilage3 of Ciraolo's home.4 The
court of appeals also pointed out that the height of Ciraolo's two fences
provided objective criteria from which the court could conclude that Ciraolo
1. An affidavit containing observations gathered during the overflight provided the basis
for issuance of the search warrant. The affidavit contained a description of the anonymous tip,
the officers' naked-eye observations, and a photograph of Ciraolo's backyard and house and
nearby homes.
2. California v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1090, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 98 (1984).
3. In Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), the Supreme Court defined "curti-
lage" as "the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home." Id. at 180.
4. 161 Cal. App. 3d at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
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manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy. 5 The California Supreme
Court denied the state's petition for review. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Held reversed: Naked-eye aerial observation of a
fenced backyard does not violate the owner's fourth amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S.
Ct. 1809, 90 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1986).
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROHIBITION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides a spe-
cific prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 6 Prior to 1967
the Supreme Court strictly construed the fourth amendment in developing a
standard for determining areas that would be protected against unreasonable
search and seizure. 7 The Court originally limited constitutionally protected
areas8 only to one's person, house, papers, and effects.9
Early Supreme Court cases based the fourth amendment prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures on the concept of physical trespass onto
5. Id. at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
For a detailed account of the history of the fourth amendment see W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1 (1st ed. 1978) (discussion of
origins and purposes of fourth amendment protections); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 30-
42 (1966) (historical account of fourth amendment's development from colonial era to ratifica-
tion in 1791); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-78 (1937) (detailed history of fourth amendment
development).
7. See Note, Oliver v. United States: Will Expectations of Privacy Shield Criminal Acts
No More?, 36 MERCER L. REV. 1401, 1402-03 (1985) (analysis of early Supreme Court cases in
which Court interpreted wording of fourth amendment literally in applying it to decisions).
The concept that certain places required greater protection than others stems back to the
period of time prior to the American Revolution. The authors of the fourth amendment were
very cognizant of British officials' abusive use of writs of assistance and general warrants in the
colonies before the War of Independence. See N. LASSON, supra note 6, at 51-78. Therefore,
the authors of the fourth amendment carefully worded the amendment to insure the protection
of people's security "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. Justice Frank, in his dissenting opinion in United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 314
(2d Cir. 1951), first used the term "constitutionally protected areas" to describe the scope of
the fourth amendment's protection.
9. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 357
(1974). Over the years, courts have expanded the definition of constitutionally protected areas
to include apartments, hotel rooms, stores, and warehouses. See, e.g., Clinton v. Virginia, 377
U.S. 158, 158 (1964) (per curiam) (warrantless search of apartment held to be violation of
fourth amendment); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (warrantless search of hotel
room violative of fourth amendment); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964) (war-
rantless search of car unreasonable under fourth amendment).
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constitutionally protected areas. 10 Federal agents invading a home in search
of illegal conduct constituted a blatant example of an unconstitutional
search." If, however, the federal agents looked for evidence of illegal con-
duct in an open field, such conduct did not constitute a search since open
fields were not a traditionally protected area. 12 In Hester v. United States,13
for example, the Supreme Court invoked a strict reading of the fourth
amendment in ruling that the amendment's protection did not extend to an
open field.' 4 In Hester revenue officers staked out a field near the home of
the defendant's father. When the agents saw the defendant hand a bottle of
illicit whiskey to a suspected customer, the agents seized the bottle and ar-
rested Hester. The Court held that police may constitutionally search an
open field, because they only commit a technical trespass on the property. '5
The Court held that the fourth amendment's protection of "persons, houses,
papers, and effects" did not extend to open fields.' 6
The Court did not relax its fourth amendment analysis despite develop-
ments in technology that allowed intrusion into constitutionally protected
areas without physical trespass. In an early surveillance case, Olmstead v.
United States,17 the Supreme Court held that wiretapping telephone lines
outside of a defendant's property did not constitute a search since no physi-
cal invasion or trespass of a traditionally protected area occurred.' 8 The
Supreme Court also applied the constitutionally protected areas standard to
other methods of surveillance. In Goldman v. United States 19 the Court held
that placing a detectaphone against a wall to hear conversations in the office
next door did not violate the fourth amendment since no physical trespass
occurred. 20 The Goldman dissent, however, maintained that the Court
10. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (attachment of listening device
on homeowner's property constituted physical trespass and violated fourth amendment); Lee
v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751-52 (1952) (federal agents' use of concealed microphone to
tape petitioner in incriminating conversation on petitioner's property not fourth amendment
violation since no physical trespass occurred within constitutionally protected area); Goldman
v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (placement of eavesdropping device against office
wall to hear conversations in adjoining office did not violate fourth amendment since no unau-
thorized physical encroachment within constitutionally protected area occurred); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (evidence of conspiracy obtained by wiretapping tele-
phone lines of defendant's residence and office did not violate fourth amendment because no
physical intrusion on defendant's private property occurred).
11. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924); Note, Fourth Amendment
Implications of Warrantless Aerial Surveillance, 17 VAL. U.L. REV. 309, 313 (1983).
12. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924).
13. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
14. Id. at 59.
15. Id. at 58-59. Even though the officers were physically on Hester's land, Hester's own
actions disclosed the illegal articles. The officers' presence could be termed a technical tres-
pass, but not an illegal trespass. The evidence was not obtained by entry of Hester's house. Id.
16. Id. at 59.
17. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
18. Id. at 466. The agents did not conduct the Olmstead wiretapping in the conspirators'
building, but in the basement of a nearby building. The Supreme Court held that no search
took place since the tapping connections occurred on public property, and since no trespass
occurred on the defendant's private property. Id. at 464-66.
19. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
20. Id. at 134.
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should have expanded the fourth amendment protections. Since advances in
technology allowed police greater access to individuals' privacy, the search
of a constitutionally protected area such as the home or office no longer
required physical entry. 21 The dissent argued that the Court's holding that
police could enter protected areas without physical trespass warranted a re-
examination of the constitutionally protected areas standard.22
The Court eventually departed from strict application of the physical tres-
pass onto a constitutionally protected area requirement. In Silverman v.
United States23 the Supreme Court held that the use of a spike mike24 con-
stituted a search. Federal agents inserted the spike through a wall adjoining
defendant's home until it made contact with a heating duct. The surveil-
lance device in contact with the duct acted as a microphone that enabled the
officers to hear conversations going on in the house. The Court held that the
government's unauthorized physical intrusion and encroachment upon de-
fendant's property constituted a violation of the fourth amendment,
although no actual physical trespass occurred upon Silverman's home.25
In 1967 the Supreme Court adopted the modem approach to fourth
amendment protections in the landmark case of Katz v. United States.26 The
Court shifted its fourth amendment focus away from the constitutionally
protected areas standard toward a review of an individual's reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy. 27 In Katz FBI agents, in an attempt to uncover illicit
activities, attached a listening device to a public telephone booth to record
Katz's telephone conversations. As a result of these recordings Katz was
charged with violating a federal statute that prohibits the use of a telephone
to transmit wagering information.28 Premising its opinion in Katz on the
proposition that the fourth amendment protects people, not places, 29 the
Court ruled that using the wiretap without a warrant invaded Katz's expec-
tation of privacy.30 The Court, therefore, held the wiretap unconstitu-
tional.31 The Court specifically noted that what a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not subject to fourth amend-
ment protection. 32 The Court also noted, however, that if a person wants to
21, Id. at 138-39 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
22. Id. at 138 (conditions of modem life warranted expansion of fourth amendment if
people were to enjoy full benefit of privacy provided by Constitution); see Note, supra note 11,
at 313.
23. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
24. A spike mike is a microphone with a spike about a foot long attached to it, together
with an amplifier, a power pack, and earphones. Id. at 506.
25. Id. at 510-11.
26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
27. Id. at 351.
28. Id. at 347.
29. Id. at 351.
30. Id. at 353.
31. Id.; see Note, The EPA's Use of Aerial Photography Violates the Fourth Amendment:
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 15 CONN. L. REV. 327, 337 (1983).
32. 389 U.S. at 353. A homeowner does not completely lose fourth amendment protec-
tion by inviting people into his home for the transaction of illegal business. Recznik v. City of
Lorain, 393 U.S. 166, 169 (1968). The fourth amendment, however, does not provide protec-
tion against the risk that one of the guests is an undercover police officer, since the amendment
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keep something private, even in an area publicly accessible, it may be consti-
tutionally protected. 33 According to the Court, Katz had justifiably relied
on the privacy of the telephone booth.34 The Katz opinion, however, failed
to define when a court could determine that an individual had justifiably
relied on the privacy of a place, or how the courts should apply the reason-
able expectation of privacy test in subsequent fourth amendment cases. 3"
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz established a more concrete basis for
fourth amendment protection. 36 He interpreted the reasonable expectation
of privacy test as having two elements. The first requirement was that a
person must exhibit an actual subjective expectation of privacy. 37 The sec-
ond element required that the expectation be one that society considered
reasonable. 38 If these two elements were not satisfied, a fourth amendment
search did not occur, and no warrant was necessary. 39 Although substantial
opposition to Justice Harlan's test exists,40 some opinions of the Supreme
Court have adopted this two-part test when resolving fourth amendment is-
sues. 4' In his dissent in United States v. White 42 Justice Harlan stated that
in applying the second part of the Katz test the courts should base an assess-
ment of a socially reasonable expectation of privacy on a variety of factors
including the public's interest in freedom from government intrusion.43
The Katz decision caused confusion among state and lower federal courts
does not protect a wrongdoer who mistakenly believes that a person the wrongdoer voluntarily
makes privy to illegal activity will not reveal it. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750
(1971).
33. 389 U.S. at 351-52. According to Katz, if a person justifiably relies on a place, seem-
ingly any place, as private, and the government intrudes upon that place, a search has oc-
curred. The search is presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant. Id. at
361.
34. Id. at 353.
35. See Note, supra note 11, at 311.
36. 389 U.S. at 360.
37. Id. at 361.
38. Id.
39. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-56 (1979). In Smith the installation of a
pen register, a device used to record numbers dialed from the.suspect's home, did not violate
the fourth amendment. The Court held that since the petitioner did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy as required by the Katz test, no search occurred, and thus, no fourth
amendment violation existed. Id.
40. See Note, supra note 11, at 343 (description of various problems confronted by courts
in applying the Harlan test); see also Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy or, a Man's Home is His Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 63, 74 (1974)
(critical analysis of the Harlan twofold test and potential misuse by courts); Note, Criminal
Procedure-Oliver v. United States: The Open Fields Doctrine Survives Katz, 63 N.C.L. REV.
546, 552-53 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Criminal Procedure] (although Court applied Harlan's
two-part test, second part of the test proved troublesome).
41. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S.
287, 292 (1984); Terry v, Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); United States v. Thomas, 729 F.2d 120,
122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 158, 83 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1984); De Rochemont v. Commis-
sioner, 628 F. Supp. 957, 962 (N.D. Ind. 1986); United States v. Wylder, 590 F. Supp. 926, 927
(D. Or. 1984).
42. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
43. Id. at 786. Justice Harlan asserted that the nature of the government intrusion and its
probable impact on the individual's sense of security must be weighed against the usefulness of




in decisions involving warrantless searches of open fields.44 In Oliver v.
United States45 the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to clarify the con-
fusion surrounding the applicability of the Katz standard to open fields.46 In
Oliver the Supreme Court consolidated appeals from two factually similar
lower court decisions. 47 In each case police officers, disregarding no-trespass
signs, entered private land and discovered marijuana growing in fields. Both
landowners were arrested and indicted, one for the illegal manufacture of
marijuana 48 and the other for violating a state statute barring distribution of
illicit drugs.4 9
In deciding Oliver the court determined that no contradiction existed be-
tween Katz and Hester and preserved the open fields doctrine as an exception
to the fourth amendment.50 The Court reconciled the Katz decision with
Hester by applying the second part of Justice Harlan's test for the reasonable
expectation of privacy.5 1 The Court determined that privacy in an open field
is not an interest society would recognize as reasonable, 52 and held that the
proper test for determining whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate is
whether the intrusion by the government into a certain area infringes upon
the personal and societal values protected by the fourth amendment.
53
While noting that no single factor was determinative, the majority looked to
several factors in determining whether a given place may be subject to unrea-
44. See Note, Criminal Procedure, supra note 40, at 553. Katz, repudiating the property
basis for fourth amendment protection, made the viability of the open field doctrine questiona-
ble. The Katz opinion impliedly raised the possibility of a reasonable expectation of privacy in
an open field. Id. But see United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848, 852-53 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (con-
victions for marijuana importation upheld when no legitimate expectation of privacy existed in
open barn); United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 50-51 (2d. Cir.) (no legitimate expectation of
privacy in private land clearly visible from public road and easily observable by outsiders who
could enter property at will), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982); Commonwealth v. Janek, 242
Pa. Super. 340, 363 A.2d 1299, 1300 (1976) (seizure of evidence from a field upheld despite
seclusion of area and posted warnings against trespassing).
45. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
46. See id. at 177-82; Note, The Return to Open Season for Police in the Open Field, 50
Mo. L. REV. 425, 430 (1985).
47. 466 U.S. at 178-79. The lower court decisions were United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d
356 (6th Cir. 1982), and State v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982).
48. Oliver, 686 F.2d at 358.
49. Thornton, 453 A.2d at 490.
50. 466 U.S. at 184; see Note, Criminal Procedure, supra note 40, at 556.
51. 466 U.S. at 176-78; see Note, Criminal Procedure, supra note 40, at 556.
52. 466 U.S. at 177. The Court noted:
[o]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the
Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance.
There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as
the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields. Moreover, as a practical mat-
ter these lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a
home, an office or commercial structure would not be. It is not generally true
that fences or no trespassing signs effectively bar the public from viewing open
fields in rural areas. And both petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton con-
cede that the public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air. For
these reasons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expec-
tation that "society recognizes as reasonable."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
53. Id. at 182-83.
[Vol. 401138
sonable governmental invasions. 54 The first factor was the intention of the
drafters of the fourth amendment; 5 the second, the uses to which an area
has been put;56 and the third, societal understanding that certain areas de-
serve protection. 57 The Court distinguished open fields from areas sur-
rounding the home, which are defined as curtilage and are protected under
the fourth amendment.58 The Court described the curtilage as the area used
for intimate activities sought to be protected by the framers of the Constitu-
tion.59 Such activities would include activities associated with the sanctity of
the home.6° The Court concluded that an individual cannot legitimately de-
mand privacy for activities carried on outdoors in fields, except in the area
immediately surrounding his home.6 1
Recognizing the traditional expectation of privacy within a dwelling, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Knotts62 held that such expectation of
privacy did not extend to visual observation of a dwelling conducted from
public places. 63 In Knotts police officers placed a beeper6 in a drum of chlo-
roform purchased by a suspect. The officers believed that the suspect used
the chloroform to manufacture illicit drugs. The officers, by visual surveil-
lance and by monitoring the beeper signals, followed the car in which the
suspect had placed the chloroform to the suspect's cabin. After three days of
visually surveying the cabin and movements outside the cabin, the officers
secured a search warrant. The search of the cabin led to Knott's conviction.
The Supreme Court held that the three-day surveillance of the cabin did not
constitute a search under the fourth amendment on the basis that the of-
ficers' visual surveillance of Knotts from a public place did not invade any of
his legitimate expectations of privacy. 6 5
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the curtilage doctrine in Dow Chemical Co.
v. United States.66 In Dow the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) em-
ployed a commercial aerial photographer to take photographs of one of
Dow's chemical plants after Dow denied the agency's request for an on-site
inspection. Without an administrative search warrant the EPA instructed
the photographer to photograph Dow's facility from various altitudes, all
within navigable airspace. The Court held that no search occurred as con-
templated under the fourth amendment. 67
54. Id. at 177-78 (citing with approval Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1978)).
55. Id. at 178.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 179; see supra note 52.
58. 466 U.S. at 180; see Note, supra note 7, at 1410.
59. 466 U.S. at 180 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
63. Id. at 282.
64. "A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic sig-
nals that can be picked up by a radio receiver." Id. at 277.
65. Id. at 280-85.
66. 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825-27, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226, 235-38 (1986). The Supreme Court de-
cided Dow as a companion case to Ciraolo.
67. Id. at 1827, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 238.
1986] NOTES 1139
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
According to the Court, the open areas of an industrial plant are not the
same as the curtilage of a dwelling. 68 The Court reemphasized the Oliver
Court's definition of curtilage as conceptually limited to the sanctity of the
home.69 The Court further reasoned that the activities conducted in outdoor
areas or spaces between the buildings or structures of a manufacturing plant
do not enjoy the same fourth amendment protection as the intimate activities
associated with the home and its curtilage. 70 The Court concluded that, for
the purpose of aerial surveillance, the open areas of an industrial manufac-
turing plant are more analogous to an open field than to the curtilage of a
home;71 thus, the aerial surveillance was not a search as contemplated under
the fourth amendment. 72
II. CALIFORNIA V CIRAOLO
In California v. Ciraolo the Supreme Court clarified and reaffirmed the
holdings and rationale of Katz and Oliver as applied to the aerial observation
of activities within the curtilage of a home.73 The question facing the Court
in Ciraolo was whether the fourth amendment protects the curtilage of a
dwelling from all observation, including aerial surveillance. 74 The majority
opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, 75 first recognized that Justice
Harlan's two-part test announced in Katz76 was the proper basis for the
analysis of whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. 77 The Court conceded that Ciraolo's backyard was
within the definition of curtilage as defined in Oliver.78 That area, however,
was not immune from all warrantless observations by police, including the
naked-eye observation of the backyard from an altitude of 1,000 feet. 79
Applying Justice Harlan's two-part test, the Court determined first,
whether Ciraolo had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy, and sec-
ond, whether society was willing to recognize that expectation as reason-
able.80 The Court conceded that Ciraolo manifested a subjective expectation
of privacy from observations from street-level views, basing its observation
on the fact that respondent had erected a ten-foot fence.81 The Court, how-
ever, could not construe this fact to be a manifestation of Ciraolo's expecta-
tion of privacy from all observations of his backyard.8 2 Ciraolo's fence,
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1825, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 236 (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180); see supra text accom-
panying note 59.
70. 106 S. Ct. at 1825, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 236.
71. Id. at 1827, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 238.
72. Id.
73. 106 S. Ct. at 1811-12, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 215-16.
74. Id. at 1811, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 214.
75. Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor joined the opinion of the Court.
76. 389 U.S. at 360; see supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
77. 106 S. Ct. at 1811, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 215 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360).
78. Id. at 1812, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 216 (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180).
79. 106 S. Ct. at 1812, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 216.
80. Id.; see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
81. 106 S. Ct. at 1811, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 215.
82. Id. at 1812, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 216.
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regardless of its height, did not shield views of the yard from above.
The Court's opinion next turned to the second element of the Katz test,
the analysis of whether the respondent's expectation was reasonable. The
Court, echoing Oliver, reemphasized that the legitimacy of an individual's
expectation of privacy does not flow from his choice to conceal assertedly
private activity, but rather from the impermissibility of governmental intru-
sion upon personal and societal values protected by the fourth amendment. 83
In this case society was not prepared to protect Ciraolo's expectation that his
garden was protected from all observation. 84
The majority based its holding on the fact that, although the respondent's
backyard was concededly within the curtilage of his home, the fence did not
bar all observation by the police. 85 Even though an individual manifests his
expectations of privacy by taking measures to restrict some views of his ac-
tivities, such measures do not preclude a governmental officer from making
observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be.86 The
public vantage point in this case, the Court pointed out, was the navigable
airspace in which Officers Shutz and Rodriguez flew in order to view
Ciraolo's backyard.87 The Court further explained that any member of the
public flying in the airspace could have observed what the officers viewed. 88
The fact that the officers were trained experts in the detection of marijuana
was irrelevant. 89 The Court reasoned that the officers' observations were
precisely what a governmental agent needed to provide in order to obtain a
warrant. 90
The majority, dismissed the dissent's contention that the majority opinion
ignored Justice Harlan's warning in his Katz concurrence. 91 Justice Harlan
had warned that the Court should not limit the fourth amendment's applica-
tion to physical intrusions onto private property. 92 The majority stated that
Justice Harlan's concurrence was not aimed at simple visual observations
from a public place, but at electronic interference with private conversa-
tions.93 The majority opinion reasoned that although the Court, subsequent
to Katz, required warrants for electronic surveillances of private conversa-
tions,94 Justice Harlan would not consider an aircraft to be an electronic
development that could "stealthily intrude upon an individual's privacy." 95
83. Id. (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83); see supra notes 45-61.
84. 106 S. Ct. at 1813, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 217.
85. Id. at 1812, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 216.
86. Id. The Court relied on United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983), for its
premise that fourth amendment protection does not extend to the visual observation of activi-
ties from a public place. Id.; see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.





92. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
93. 106 S. Ct. at 1813, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 217.
94. Id.; see United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 324 (1972) (warrant-
less surveillances of conspirators' conversations violated the fourth amendment).
95. 106 S. Ct. at 1813, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 218.
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The Court concluded its opinion by stating that the fourth amendment did
not require police, traveling in the public airways, first to obtain a warrant
before observing what is visible to the naked eye. 96 The Court held that
Ciraolo unreasonably expected that his marijuana plants could be constitu-
tionally protected from naked eye observation from an altitude of 1000
feet. 9 7
The Ciraolo dissent, written by Justice Powell,98 contended that a fourth
amendment violation occurred when the Santa Clara police officers observed
Ciraolo's backyard from the air.99 The dissenting opinion criticized the ma-
jority's application of the Katz test, 100 arguing that Katz and subsequent de-
cisions established a new standard that defined a fourth amendment
search. 101 That standard, the dissent explained, changed from one that
turned on whether police conducted the surveillance by invading a constitu-
tionally protected area to a standard that turned on whether the surveillance
in question invaded a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy. 102
The majority and dissenting opinions diverged on the Court's opinion that
Ciraolo was unreasonable to expect privacy from aerial observation. The
dissent criticized the majority opinion's reliance on the fact that Officer
Shutz made his observations from public navigable airspace. The dissent
pointed out that the Court's reliance on the manner of surveillance was in
direct contrast to the Katz standard, which focused on the interests of the
individual and allowed society to identify a constitutionally protected right
of privacy.10 3 Justice Powell concluded that the majority opinion rested
solely on the fact that, because members of the public, flying in planes, can
look down at homes as they fly over them, citizens must bear the risk that
activities in their backyards will be observed.1°4 The dissent refused to im-
pose such a risk on homeowners, emphasizing that people use public air-
space for travel, business, or pleasure, not for the purpose of observing
activities occurring in residential backyards.105
The dissent agreed with the majority that the respondent's backyard was
within the curtilage of his home and that he had a legitimate expectation of
privacy there with respect to warrantless surveillances from ground level. 106
Justice Powell, however, found that the majority's rejection of Ciraolo's
claim of protection was at odds with the Court's reaffirmation of the curti-
lage doctrine in Ciraolo's case and in the companion case, Dow Chemical Co.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in the dissent.
99. 106 S. Ct. at 1814, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 218.
100. Id. at 1815, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 220.
101. Id. at 1816, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 220-21; see United States v. United States Dist. Court,
407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
102. 106 S. Ct. at 1815, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 220.
103. Id. at 1817-18, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 223.
104. Id. at 1818, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 223.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1817, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 222.
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v. United States.'0 7 According to the dissent, previous decisions inquiring
into the legitimacy of an individual's expectation of privacy concentrated on
determining whether the government's intrusion infringed upon personal
and societal values protected by the fourth amendment.108 The determina-
tion of the inquiry, the dissent continued, was often based on a reference to a
place, and a home is a place in which a subjective expectation of privacy is
almost always legitimate. 1° 9
The dissent also criticized the Court's reliance on United States v.
Knotts.110 Justice Powell pointed out that the activities in Knotts took place
on public streets, not in private homes; whereas, the activity observed in
Ciraolo took place within the curtilage of respondent's home, a private
area. II The dissent, therefore, explained the majority's reasoning as being a
judgment that the risk to privacy posed by the remote possibility that a pri-
vate airplane passenger will notice outdoor activities is equivalent to the risk
of official aerial surveillance." 2 The dissent, however, found it hard to be-
lieve that society is prepared to force individuals to bear the risk of aerial
surveillance of their backyards by police without a warrant. 1 3 In its conclu-
sion the dissent found that Ciraolo had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his yard and thus concluded that the aerial surveillance by the police
without a warrant and for the purpose of discovering evidence of a crime
constituted a search conducted in violation of the fourth amendment.' '4
III. CONCLUSION
In California v. Ciraolo the Supreme Court held that the fourth amend-
ment does not protect an area within the curtilage of a home from warrant-
less naked eye surveillance from a public vantage point. The Court based its
findings on the fact that although Ciraolo manifested some expectation of
privacy, the measures he took only barred observation from some views.
Thus, the Court held that Ciraolo was unreasonable to expect the fourth
amendment to protect his backyard against visual intrusion from all views.
The Court ruled that society would not accept Ciraolo's expectations as rea-
sonable. Even though Ciraolo's backyard was within the curtilage of his
home, that fact, of itself, did not bar all observation by police.
The Supreme Court in Katz designed a standard that preserved the es-
sence of fourth amendment protection: the right of the individual reasonably
to expect privacy and thus freedom from governmental intrusion. Even
107. Id. at 1819, 1825-27, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 226, 235-38; see supra notes 66-72 and accompa-
nying text.
108. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980); supra text
accompanying note 53.
109. 106 S. Ct. at 1817, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 221; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511 (1961). At the center of the fourth amendment is a person's right to retreat into his
own home and be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions. Id.
110. 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983); see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
111. 106 S. Ct. at 1818, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 224.
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before Katz the Court had consistently upheld the right to privacy and free-
dom from intrusion in one's home. Ciraolo is a large incursion into the es-
sence of fourth amendment protection. Individuals must now bear the risk
that private activities conducted in the home and surrounding areas may be
watched by police without a warrant unless all possible views are obstructed.
Saundra R. Steinberg
